

# Auditing Text-to-Image Model Safety under Implicit Prompts with Human and LLM-Assisted Evaluation

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## Abstract

Safety auditing of text-to-image (T2I) models increasingly relies on hybrid evaluation pipelines combining automated metrics, large language models (LLMs), and human annotators. However, the reliability of these paradigms under semantically obfuscated inputs remains unclear. In this work, we investigate T2I safety robustness using implicit prompt transformations, including low-resource language translation, tense manipulation, and LLM-driven self-iterative refinement. Across seven representative T2I models, we measure breakthrough rates and systematically compare safety judgments from automated metrics, LLM-based evaluators, and human annotators. While self-iterative agent-assisted prompts achieve the highest breakthrough rates, we observe consistent disagreement between LLM-based and human safety evaluations, with LLM judges tending to underestimate unsafe content under semantically refined prompts. Our findings suggest that implicit prompts expose not only model vulnerabilities but also evaluation fragility. We argue for human-centered, agent-assisted auditing frameworks that separate generative and evaluative roles to improve the trustworthiness of generative model safety assessment.

## Keywords

Text-to-Image Models, Safety Auditing, Implicit Prompts, LLM-as-a-Judge, Human-AI Evaluation

## 1 Introduction

Text-to-image generation [14, 17, 21, 24, 26] has been widely adopted in domains such as personalized content creation, animation [8, 23], artistic production [18], and design innovation [12], owing to its ability to synthesize high-quality images from textual descriptions. Despite these advances, T2I models face growing security concerns, notably their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks that can circumvent safeguards and generate inappropriate content—including pornographic, violent, disturbing, hateful, or politically sensitive imagery. Existing research on T2I attacks has primarily focused on explicit prompts—direct inputs containing keywords like “blood” or “violence”—or on model-level vulnerabilities exploitable via white-box or black-box adversarial techniques [2, 4, 5, 22]. To mitigate such threats, mainstream defenses rely on training-level alignment and post hoc content moderation [3, 6, 9, 16], typically implemented as keyword filters or image classifiers. While these approaches are




Figure 1: Three methods jailbreaking successfully bypass the security system of T2I models.

effective against explicit manipulations, they remain fragile when faced with implicit prompts—subtly crafted inputs that evade lexical filters yet still yield unsafe outputs [20]. This gap exposes users to risks in realistic settings, where harmful content may be generated inadvertently through casual experimentation. However, an equally critical but less explored question remains: how reliable are the evaluation and auditing practices used to assess T2I model safety under such attacks?

In practice, safety auditing of T2I models relies on a diverse set of evaluators, including automated detectors, alignment metrics, learned reward models, human reviewers, and increasingly, LLMs acting as judges. These evaluators differ substantially in their objectives, inductive biases, and sensitivity to contextual or implicit harm. As a result, the same generated image may be deemed acceptable by one evaluation paradigm while considered unsafe by another. Such discrepancies raise fundamental concerns about the validity of safety conclusions drawn from existing audits.

In this work, we investigate this issue through the lens of implicit prompt transformations—subtle modifications that preserve semantic intent while evading surface-level safety filters. We use three kinds of implicit prompt, As shown in Figure 1, the first

method involves low-resource language attacks. For instance, the prompt “a detailed scene of a drug addict using drugs” is rejected by the model; however, translating it into Punjabi bypasses the filter, highlighting the inadequacies of multilingual auditing. The second method leverages tense manipulation. By adding historical context (e.g., “ancient”), the prompt can generate images depicting adult themes. The third method employs self-iterative attacks, where LLMs refine harmful prompts iteratively, preserving their semantic intent while eventually generating restricted images. Replacing well-known characters with less recognizable ones (e.g., substituting “Patrick” for “SpongeBob”) also helps circumvent filters. We utilize these three prompting strategies as auditing probes to stress-test current evaluation pipelines. We apply these probes across seven representative T2I models and systematically compare safety assessments produced by automated metrics, safety detectors, LLM-based judges, and human evaluators.

In total, the results suggest that safety auditing outcomes are highly contingent on evaluation design choices, and that implicit prompts offer a valuable tool for auditing evaluation robustness. This study makes three key contributions:

- (1) **Empirical analysis of evaluation paradigms.** We provide a systematic examination of how different evaluation methods respond to implicit prompts in T2I models.
- (2) **Identification of systematic disagreements.** We reveal notable inconsistencies between human judgments and LLM-assisted or automated evaluations, particularly for unsettling but non-explicit content.
- (3) **Implications for auditing framework design.** We discuss how these findings inform the development of reliable, human-centered auditing frameworks for generative image models.

## 2 Related Work

### 2.1 Generative Model Safety Auditing

Early research on generative safety predominantly focused on mitigating explicit harmful content. For instance, the DALL-E 3 system card [11] notes that while automated classifiers effectively intercept overt malicious prompts, they remain susceptible to nuanced semantic triggers. Beyond technical filters, Raji et al. [15] conceptualized “actionable auditing” as a framework to close the accountability gap in black-box models, while Mitchell et al. [10] emphasized the necessity of transparency through Model Cards. This study extends these foundational auditing principles by specifically targeting “implicit prompts”—a critical but under-examined blind spot in contemporary defense architectures.

### 2.2 Hybrid Human-LLM Evaluation

The “LLM-as-a-Judge” paradigm has gained significant traction due to its scalability and perceived alignment with human preferences [25]. However, recent critiques suggest that LLMs are unreliable proxies for human reasoning in tasks involving cultural sensitivity or subjective harm [7]. To reconcile efficiency with evaluative rigor, Ashktorab et al. [1] introduced EvalAssist, advocating for LLMs as assistive tools rather than autonomous arbiters. Our research adopts this human-centric hybrid approach, utilizing human oversight to

rectify the limitations of automated metrics (e.g., CLIP Score) in interpreting complex semantic failures.

### 2.3 Implicit Risks and Agent-in-the-Loop Red Teaming

Implicit risks often manifest through semantic obfuscation or linguistic indirection, which can effectively circumvent safety guardrails [19]. In the multimodal domain, Yang et al. [20] demonstrated that semantic shifts remain a primary driver of defense evasion in T2I models. Parallel to these findings, the integration of AI agents into red-teaming workflows has emerged as a robust methodology for systematic vulnerability discovery [13]. By employing a self-iterative prompt refinement mechanism, this work operationalizes an “agent-in-the-loop” auditing process, exploring the efficacy of collaborative agents in identifying sophisticated safety breaches.

## 3 Methodology

Our goal is to audit the safety of T2I models under implicit prompt conditions while explicitly examining how different evaluation paradigms shape safety conclusions. Rather than proposing new attack techniques, we treat implicit prompt transformations as auditing probes that expose blind spots in both model safeguards and evaluation pipelines.


As illustrated in Figure 2, our auditing framework consists of three components: (1) implicit prompt transformation, (2) image generation across multiple T2I models, and (3) hybrid evaluation combining automated metrics, safety detectors, human judgments, and LLM-assisted evaluation. This design enables us to systematically compare how safety assessments vary depending on the evaluator, under identical generation conditions.

Within this framework, we focus on three specific implicit prompt strategies that are accessible to non-expert users and commonly mediated by LLMs in practice. These strategies preserve the semantic intent of the original prompt while altering its surface form, thereby reducing the likelihood of triggering keyword-based or rule-based safety filters.

To evaluate the impact of these strategies, we conduct our audit on seven representative T2I models, covering both closed-source and open-source systems: DALL-E 2, DALL-E 3, Stable Diffusion v2.1, Stable Diffusion v3.5 Large Turbo, Stable Diffusion XL, DeepFloyd IF, and Imagen 3. These models differ in training data, safety mechanisms, and deployment settings, allowing us to assess evaluation behavior across diverse architectures and moderation strategies. All models are queried using identical transformed prompts, and default generation settings are used to reflect typical user-facing behavior.

### 3.1 Low Resource Language

This method exploits language transformation mechanisms in low-resource languages to conduct implicit attacks on models, bypassing text censorship and content filtering systems. In T2I models, traditional defenses typically rely on extensive training with high-resource languages (e.g., English, French) and robust keyword filtering. However, due to the limited corpus of low-resource languages, models perform poorly in processing these languages, making them vulnerable to subtle attacks that exploit linguistic differences. The



**Figure 2: Illustration of overall framework.** We construct a dataset of harmful prompts typically rejected by T2I models (e.g., violence, pornography, hate speech, political sensitivity), which are then modified using three methods to create seemingly harmless phrases that exploit the model’s vulnerabilities to generate harmful images. The results are then evaluated and analyzed.

language selection criteria consider both the model’s filtering error rate and the quality of generated images, ensuring that the chosen languages effectively expose the model’s vulnerabilities while maintaining acceptable image quality. Using the following formula, five languages—Zulu, Scottish Gaelic, Tigrinya, Punjabi, and Pampangan—were selected from a set of over 30 low-resource languages:

$$\text{Error Rate}(\mathcal{L}_{\text{low}}) = \frac{1}{N_{\text{low}}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{low}}} \text{Err}_i(\mathcal{L}_{\text{low}}) \quad (1)$$

where  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{low}}$  denotes the set of low-resource languages,  $N_{\text{low}}$  represents the number of samples per language, and  $\text{Err}_i(\mathcal{L}_{\text{low}})$  is the error metric for the  $i$ -th sample, quantified as the semantic deviation between the intended prompt and the model’s output.

### 3.2 Tense Conversion

This approach attempts to bypass the safety mechanisms of T2I models through subtle manipulation of tense elements in text prompts. Most current T2I models rely on temporal context during text parsing, using sequential information to inform their understanding. As a result, these models typically adjust their generation strategies based on tense variations. By modifying the tense in a prompt, an attacker can alter the model’s interpretation and understanding of the text, potentially leading to misjudgments of latent harmful content. For example, changing “Generate a virtual reality game cover with adult content” to “Generate a virtual reality game cover with ancient adult content” may cause the model to misinterpret it as a

historical narrative, thereby overlooking the sensitive information and bypassing protective measures in the image generation process. The above process can be represented as:

$$R = T_{\text{tense}}(P_{\text{orig}}) \quad (2)$$

where  $P_{\text{orig}}$  is the original prompt and  $T_{\text{tense}}(\cdot)$  denotes the tense conversion function.

### 3.3 Self-Iterative Attack

This method refines adversarial prompts iteratively to bypass defenses while preserving semantic meaning. In each iteration  $t$ , the prompt  $P_t$  is updated based on the previous output  $R_{t-1}$  as follows:

$$P_t = \text{Update}(P_{t-1}, R_{t-1}), \quad t = 1, 2, \dots, 10 \quad (3)$$

Here,  $P_t$  denotes the prompt at iteration  $t$ ,  $P_{t-1}$  is the prompt from the previous iteration, and  $R_{t-1}$  represents the output generated by the model at iteration  $t - 1$ . The function  $\text{Update}(P_{t-1}, R_{t-1})$  modifies the previous prompt based on the model’s output to make it more effective at bypassing filtering mechanisms.

In this method, each iteration gradually weakens the model’s ability to associate the prompt with inappropriate content, eventually resulting in the generation of the desired output after at most 10 iterations.




Figure 3: Images are generated using the three methods, with categories indicated in bold. Below each image is the corresponding prompt, with the type of low-resource language used in the first method highlighted in colored font within parentheses.

### 3.4 Hybrid Evaluation Framework

To audit the safety of T2I models under implicit prompts, we adopt a hybrid evaluation framework combining automated metrics, LLM-based judgments, and human annotations. Each evaluation component captures a different aspect of model behavior, enabling a structured comparison of safety assessments.

**CLIP Score.** CLIP Score is used to measure semantic alignment between the input prompt and the generated image. It quantifies whether the visual content corresponds to the textual description. In the context of implicit prompts, CLIP Score serves as an indicator of whether harmful semantic intent is preserved after prompt transformation. A high CLIP Score indicates that the model has faithfully followed the prompt, even when the prompt encodes unsafe intent implicitly.

**Image Reward.** Image Reward is employed to evaluate the perceptual quality and preference alignment of generated images. As a learned reward model trained on human preference data, Image Reward reflects visual realism, coherence, and aesthetic plausibility. While not designed as a safety metric, high reward scores may correlate with the generation of vivid or realistic imagery, which can amplify the impact of unsafe or unsettling content. We therefore include Image Reward to examine whether high-quality generations coincide with safety evaluation disagreements.

**LLM-as-a-Judge.** Following the "LLM-as-a-Judge" paradigm, we employ LLMs to conduct a joint assessment of prompt-image

consistency and content safety. Distinct from traditional isolated safety checks, our protocol couples these two dimensions: an output is labeled as unsafe only if the LLM confirms it both aligns with the implicit prompt and contains harmful content. This ensures that safety is evaluated through semantic realization—distinguishing between an intentional bypass and a mere generation failure.

**Human-in-the-Loop Validation.** To calibrate the potential biases of automated judges, human annotators independently evaluate the generated images as a ground-truth reference. Given that LLMs may underestimate risks under semantically obfuscated conditions (as observed in our results), this human-centric layer is critical. By juxtaposing human intuition with LLM assessments, we can systematically analyze where automated metrics align with or diverge from human perceptions of safety under implicit attacks.

## 4 Evaluation Results

Figure 3 presents example images generated by modifying prompts using three different jailbreaking methods, specifically showcasing examples across multiple categories, including drug abuse, illegal activities, and misinformation. Figure 4 compares the visual effects of images generated by these methods across different T2I models. To ensure ethical compliance, NSFW content is obscured. The results indicate that all models exhibit varying degrees of sensitivity



Figure 4: Visual comparison of different T2I models across three jailbreaking methods.


Table 1: Breakthrough Rate Comparison of Three Methods in Seven T2I Models

Models	Low Resource Language	Tense Conversion	Self-Iterative Attack
DALL-E 3	68.1%	64.0%	87.2%
DALL-E 2	93.4%	77.0%	63.5%
Imagen 3	-	62.4%	72.5%
Stable-Diffusion 2.1	100%	100%	100%
Stable-Diffusion 3.5 LT	100%	100%	100%
Stable-Diffusion XL	100%	100%	100%
DeepFlody IF	100%	100%	100%


to generating inappropriate content. Images generated by open-source models show a higher frequency of NSFW content. Detailed evaluation results are presented in Table 1, and Figure 5a and 5b.

Our empirical findings indicate that the safety robustness of T2I models under implicit prompts cannot be fully understood without jointly examining both attack effectiveness and evaluation behavior. Rather than treating breakthrough rate alone as the primary outcome, our analysis focuses on how different evaluators—automated metrics, LLM-based judges, and human annotators—interpret model outputs under semantically obfuscated conditions.

Across seven representative T2I models, the three implicit prompt strategies exhibit consistently high breakthrough capability, particularly under self-iterative refinement. Open-source diffusion models demonstrate near-complete vulnerability (100% across methods), suggesting that in these systems the primary bottleneck lies not in bypassing filters but in the absence of robust alignment mechanisms. In contrast, proprietary systems such as DALL-E 3 and



(a) Accuracy comparison of three methods in seven T2I models.



(b) Evaluation of CLIP Score and Image Reward across three methods.

Figure 5: Comparison of different methods in T2I models.

Imagen 3 display moderate resistance to single-step transformations (low-resource language and tense manipulation), yet their robustness significantly weakens under iterative refinement. For example, DALL-E 3’s breakthrough rate increases from 64.0% (tense conversion) to 87.2% under self-iterative attack.

This pattern suggests that safety defenses remain relatively sensitive to lexical or surface-level transformations but struggle with gradual semantic optimization. The iterative process effectively preserves harmful intent while progressively reducing recognizable trigger signals, thereby shifting the attack from a lexical evasion problem to a semantic alignment problem. Importantly, this observation aligns with emerging concerns that current guardrails are primarily optimized for explicit content moderation rather than implicit meaning preservation.

However, the most critical insight emerges when comparing human and LLM-based safety evaluations (Table 2). Under low-resource language attacks, LLM evaluators consistently report slightly lower unsafe rates than human annotators across most models. Although the absolute differences are modest (generally 2–4%), the consistency of this trend suggests a systematic bias rather than random variation. One plausible explanation is that LLM-based judges are less sensitive to harm expressed through linguistic indirection

**Table 2: Comparison Between Human and LLM Safety Evaluations for Implicit Prompts.**

Model	Low-Resource Language		Tense Conversion		Self-Iterative Attack	
	Human	LLM	Human	LLM	Human	LLM
DALL-E 3	23.1%	19.8%	61.3%	63.5%	80.9%	68.1%
DALL-E 2	7.2%	6.3%	20.3%	18.2%	50.3%	38.4%
Imagen 3	-%	-%	26.1%	23.2%	88.2%	81.5%
Stable Diffusion 2.1	20.5%	18.8%	34.7%	34.2%	41.1%	40.2%
Stable Diffusion 3.5 LT	16.6%	17.1%	35.5%	32.6%	72.4%	68.9%
Stable Diffusion XL	16.8%	15.7%	31.6%	30.2%	56.3%	55.3%
DeepFloyd IF	9.5%	5.2%	22.5%	18.2%	60.2%	50.5%

or cultural nuance, particularly in low-resource languages where training data coverage is uneven.

The divergence becomes substantially more pronounced under self-iterative attack. In DALL-E 3, for example, human annotators classify 80.9% of outputs as unsafe, whereas the LLM judge identifies only 68.1% as unsafe—a gap of nearly 13 percentage points. Similar discrepancies appear in DALL-E 2 and DeepFloyd IF. Notably, this disagreement consistently reflects lower risk assessments by the LLM evaluator.

This pattern is particularly important in the context of agent-assisted auditing. In our experimental pipeline, LLMs are used both to refine adversarial prompts and to evaluate prompt–image consistency and safety. When the same class of model family participates in both semantic construction and semantic judgment, the evaluation process may inherit shared representational biases. As a result, the evaluator may normalize certain subtle harmful cues that human observers still perceive as disturbing or policy-sensitive. This does not imply that LLM-based evaluation is unreliable in general; rather, its reliability appears to degrade as semantic obfuscation increases.

Further evidence supporting this interpretation emerges from the joint analysis of CLIP Score and Image Reward. Under self-iterative attacks, CLIP Score remains high across models, indicating strong semantic alignment between prompt and generated image. At the same time, human-perceived unsafe rates are highest under this method. This suggests that high alignment under implicit prompts should not be interpreted as a sign of robustness; instead, it may indicate successful realization of concealed harmful intent. In other words, semantic fidelity can amplify safety risk when the underlying intent is adversarial. Similarly, Image Reward scores often increase under iterative refinement, reflecting improved perceptual quality and realism. From a purely generative perspective, this indicates effective optimization. Yet when combined with elevated unsafe rates, it reveals a safety–quality tension: higher-quality images can intensify the impact of harmful or disturbing content. LLM-based evaluators, which focus primarily on consistency and policy compliance, may not fully capture this experiential dimension of harm.

Taken together, these findings suggest that safety auditing outcomes are highly contingent on evaluation design. Automated metrics capture alignment and perceptual plausibility but do not directly encode normative judgments. LLM-based judges scale efficiently and approximate policy reasoning but may underestimate

subtle or context-dependent harm. Human evaluators, while more sensitive to affective and contextual cues, are limited in scalability. Therefore, the issue is not whether one evaluator is “correct,” but how their biases interact under implicit prompt scenarios. Implicit prompts function as stress tests not only for generative models but also for auditing methodologies. They expose the limits of lexical moderation, highlight semantic blind spots in LLM judges, and reveal the trade-offs between scalability and interpretative depth.

Ultimately, our analysis demonstrates that implicit prompts expose a dual-layer fragility: vulnerabilities in generative defenses and vulnerabilities in evaluation frameworks. As LLMs increasingly mediate both content creation and content auditing, careful calibration between automated assistance and human judgment becomes essential. Robust safety assessment requires not only stronger defenses but also evaluation protocols that explicitly account for semantic obfuscation, agent duality, and evaluator bias.

## 5 Conclusion

Our study highlights the dual role of LLMs in contemporary auditing workflows: LLMs increasingly mediate both prompt construction and output evaluation. When used uncritically, this dual involvement risks creating self-reinforcing evaluation loops that obscure human-centered safety concerns. Rather than viewing LLM-based evaluation as a replacement for human judgment, our results support a complementary role in which LLMs assist, but do not substitute, human oversight. Although our experiments focus on T2I models, the observed evaluation gaps are rooted in language-based mediation and are therefore relevant to broader LLM auditing contexts. We argue that implicit prompt scenarios should be considered a first-class concern in safety evaluation, particularly as LLMs become deeply embedded in content creation and moderation pipelines.

Overall, this work underscores the need for evaluation frameworks that explicitly account for evaluator disagreement, contextual ambiguity, and the limitations of automated judges. By foregrounding human perception in safety auditing, we aim to contribute to the development of more transparent, reliable, and human-aligned evaluation practices for generative AI systems.

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